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THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF RESIDENTIAL
TENANTS IN MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE CASES
Henry Rose*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, William Scott signed a lease to rent an apartment from
Larry Holder in a building that Holder owned in Chicago, Illinois.' Unbe-
knownst to Scott, Holder had been sued in 1986 by Holder's mortgage
lender, Commerce Mortgage Corporation (Commerce), for foreclosure
of the mortgage on the building because.Holder had not made all of his
mortgage payments.2 Scott and his family took occupancy of the apart-
ment and made all of the rent payments to Holder that were due under
the terms of their lease.' In the foreclosure case against Holder, Com-
merce purchased the apartment building at a sheriff's sale in early 1988.'
Late in 1988, agents of Commerce and employees of the Cook County
Sheriff's office came to the apartment building to execute a writ of assis-
tance that had been issued by the court in the foreclosure case authoriz-
ing the eviction of the occupants of the building from their living units.'
Scott had received no notice of the foreclosure action or that he and his
family would be evicted from their apartment because of it.6 Scott in-
formed the agents of Commerce and the Sheriff's employees who had
come to his door that he had not received any notice regarding termina-
tion of his tenancy.' Nevertheless, the Sheriff's employees forcibly evicted
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 25 E. Pearson
St., Chicago, IL 60611-2055, (312) 915-7840, hrose@luc.edu. The author expresses
appreciation to Lauren Cooper and Fred LeBaron for research assistance and to
Heather Figus and Angelina McDaniel for production assistance.
1. The description of William Scott's tenancy is based on Judge Suzanne Con-
lon's Memorandum Opinion and Order on defendants' motions to dismiss in Scott v.
O'Grady, 760 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd 975 F2d. 366 (7th Cir. 1992).
The author of this article was one of the Scotts' attorneys in this case. The Scotts'
principal attorney was Lewis Check.
2. See Scott, 760 F. Supp. at 1291.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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the Scotts and removed their belongings from the apartment.' Many of
the Scotts' belongings were damaged or lost when the Sheriff's employees
deposited them outside the building near the street.9 The Scotts were
forced to find temporary housing after they were summarily evicted from
their home pursuant to Commerce's foreclosure action against Holder."o
After their eviction, the Scotts sued Commerce and the Sheriff con-
tending that their eviction, without notice, violated their due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The
court held that tenants with a valid leasehold interest have a property
interest under the Due Process Clause that would have entitled them to
notice before an eviction pursuant to a mortgage foreclosure action in-
volving the building in which they reside.12
Fast-forward twenty years to 2008 when mortgage foreclosures were
mushrooming. Illinois' foreclosure statute was amended in 1993 to pro-
vide that tenants living in buildings undergoing foreclosure were entitled
to notice and an opportunity to be heard before they could lose posses-
sion of their rental units.' Despite this statutory protection of their con-
stitutional right to due process, many tenants in Cook County, Illinois,
whose buildings were in foreclosure in 2008, continued to face eviction
without notice.14 Tenants facing eviction without notice due to foreclosure
occurred so often in Cook County that, in October 2008, Sheriff Thomas
Dart declared a moratorium on his staff participating in evictions of te-
nants in foreclosed buildings" until he was provided with documentation
that the tenants had received proper notification of their pending
evictions."
The problem of tenants being evicted from foreclosed buildings
without notice is not limited to Cook County, Illinois. As the number of
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1291-92.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 1292.
12. See id. at 1296-97. The court did not decide the issue of whether the Scotts
had adequate notice because, on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court ac-
cepted the Scotts' allegation of inadequate notice as true. Id. at 1297.
13. See 1993 ILL. LAws 265 (amending 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 15/1-501, 1-
504, 1-508 (LexisNexis 2011) and adding 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 15/1-701 (Lex-
isNexis 2011)).
14. See John Leland, Sheriff in Chicago Ends Evictions in Foreclosures, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A14 (according to the Sheriff's Department in 2008 it had
conducted 4,800 foreclosures, nearly triple the number they had conducted two years
before).
15. Id.
16. Mark Konkol, Evictions to Resume Monday; Dart Satisfied Court Order Pro-
tects Renters in Foreclosures, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at 17.
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residential foreclosures in the United States has skyrocketed since 2006, it
is estimated that 40 percent of the people being displaced from their resi-
dences in these foreclosures are tenants. Despite the enactment of the
federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA) that seeks
to preserve most residential tenancies in buildings undergoing foreclo-
sure," the problem of the eviction of tenants without notice persists.'9
The purpose of this article is to explore the due process rights of
tenants to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard when foreclo-
sures threaten to terminate their tenancies. PTFA should significantly re-
duce the incidence of residential tenancies being terminated as a result of
foreclosures. However, PTFA offers weak procedural protections if the
mortgagee or the successor in interest who acquires ownership pursuant
to a foreclosure seeks to terminate the tenancies of residents in the fore-
closed building. In those states that require judicial foreclosures, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should afford tenants no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard before their tenancies are terminated
due to foreclosure. In those states that allow non-judicial foreclosures,
due process protections are not likely to be available to tenants due to a
lack of state action in the foreclosure process. PTFA should be amended
to afford all tenants, including those who reside in non-judicial foreclo-
sure states, with notice and an opportunity to be heard before their ten-
ancies are terminated pursuant to a foreclosure.
II. LEGAL EFFECT OF FORECLOSURE ON
RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES
Prior to the enactment of PTFA in 2009, a mortgage foreclosure on
a building with a residential tenancy that was created after the mortgage
resulted in the termination of the tenancy because a mortgage foreclosure
17. DANILO PELLETIERE, NAT'L Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION: CHAL-
LENGEs AND OPPORTUNITIES, RECOGNIZING RENTERS IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
9 (2009), available at http://www.nlihc.org/doc/NLIHC-Renters-in-Foreclosure-
UCLA-5-2009.pdf. It is estimated that in Chicago in 2009 more renters than property
owners were displaced by mortgage foreclosures. MARK SWARTZ & RACHEL BLAKE,
LAW'S COMM. FOR BETTER HOUSING, LCBH 2009 REPORT: CHICAGO APARTMENT
BUILDING FORECLOSURES: IMPACT ON TENANTS 9 (2010).
18. PUB. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660-61 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5220
(Supp. 2011).
19. See Ken Dixon, Blumenthal Wants Tenants' Protection in Foreclosures, CONN.
PosT, Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://www.tenantstogether.org/article.php?id=1225;
Jon Shirek, Family Evicted Despite Law Protecting Tenants from Landlord's Foreclo-
sure (llAlive NBC News television broadcast, Dec. 4, 2010), available at http://www.
11alive.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=166521&catid=3.
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terminated any tenancy that was created after the mortgage.20 Since resi-
dential tenancies are typically short-term (i.e., for a term of one year or
less) and the notes that mortgages secure are long-term (i.e., involving
repayment of debt over as long as thirty years), most residential tenancies
are created after the mortgages on the building. If a mortgage predated a
tenancy, the tenancy terminated upon foreclosure of the mortgage be-
cause it was well-settled that foreclosure of a prior mortgage extinguished
a later tenancy.21 In the unlikely event that a residential tenancy was cre-
ated before the mortgage, foreclosure of the mortgage did not terminate
the tenancy because the property was already burdened by the tenancy at
the time of the mortgage, and the mortgagor had no power to grant the
property free of the tenancy.22
The historical effect of foreclosures on tenancies was dramatically
changed by Section 702 of PTFA.23 Section 702 of PTFA generally pro-
vides that for any foreclosure of residential property after the date of
PTFA's enactment (May 20, 2009), the successor in interest to the fore-
closed property takes the property subject to the remaining term of any
bona fide lease entered into before the successor in interest acquired title
to the property pursuant to the foreclosure. 24 However, the successor in
interest may terminate a tenancy as of the date of sale of the dwelling unit
to a purchaser who will occupy it as a principal residence and, if this oc-
curs, the successor in interest must provide the tenant with a notice to
vacate at least ninety days before the effective date of the notice.'
After enactment of PTFA, most residential tenancies will not be ter-
minated by a foreclosure even if the tenancy was created after the date of
the mortgage. This is because under PTFA tenancies survive a foreclosure
if they involve a bona fide lease 26 that was created before the successor in
interest acquired title in the foreclosure process27 and the foreclosed
20. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 538 (1st ed. 2001).
21. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 606
(5th ed. 2007).
22. SINGER, supra note 20, at 538.
23. PUB. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660-61 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5220).
24. Id. § 702(a)(2)(A).
25. See id. § 702(a).
26. A lease is bona fide only if:
(1) the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of the mortgagor under the
contract is not the tenant; (2) the lease or tenancy was the result of an arms-
length transaction; and (3) the lease or tenancy requires the receipt of rent
that is not substantially less than fair market rent for the property or the unit's
rent is reduced or subsidized due to a Federal, State, or local subsidy.
Id. § 702(b).
27. Id. § 702(a). The date of the notice of foreclosure is the date that complete
title to the foreclosed property is transferred to a successor entity or person as a result
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property has not been sold to a purchaser who will occupy it as a primary
residence." Although PTFA affords residential tenants important new
rights when the building is foreclosed, residential tenants continue to be
evicted pursuant to foreclosures without notice and without regard to
their rights under PTFA.29
III. APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS TO FORECLOSURES
THAT TERMINATE RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES
The Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution both
provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."" Included in the protections guaranteed by
these due process clauses are certain procedural rights of persons whose
life, liberty, or property is threatened by governmental action, protections
such as the right to receive notice of the deprivation and an opportunity
to contest the deprivation."' In the context of residential tenancies in
buildings that are undergoing foreclosure, the key due process issues for
tenants are: (1) Does a residential tenancy constitute property within the
meaning of the due process clauses?; (2) Is a residential tenancy
threatened with termination by a mortgage foreclosure on the building
containing the rental unit?; (3) If the foreclosure is sought by a private
entity or person, is state action involved?; and (4) Is a residential tenant
in a building undergoing foreclosure entitled to notice and an opportunity
to be heard to contest a termination of tenancy? Each of these issues will
be addressed in the following subparts.
A. Property Under Due Process
Property protected by the due process clauses includes traditional
forms of real property interests.32 A residential tenancy, by definition, en-
titles a tenant to possession of some portion of the owner's real prop-
erty.33 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the due process rights of
residential tenants and has stated that tenants have a "significant interest
of a court order or pursuant to provisions in a mortgage, deed of trust, or security
deed. 12 U.S.C. § 5220 ("History" subsection (c) (Supp. 2011)).
28. Id. § 5220 (see "History" subsection (a)(2)(A)).
29. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
32. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (8th
ed. 2010).
33. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72 (1972).
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in property: indeed, of the right to continued residence in their homes."
Thus, there is no doubt that a residential tenancy is the type of property
interest that is protected by the due process clauses.
B. Termination of Tenancies by Foreclosure
After the enactment of PTFA, most residential tenancies will not be
terminated by a mortgage foreclosure on a building where the tenants
reside. This is true because PTFA generally provides that a successor in
interest to a foreclosed building is subject to the rights of a bona fide
tenant to occupy the premises for the remaining term of any lease that
was entered into before title to the property was transferred to the suc-
cessor in interest." Nevertheless, a residential tenancy may still be termi-
nated in the foreclosure process under PTFA if: (1) the tenancy is not
bona fide and it was created after the mortgage was created;3 6 (2) the
tenancy is bona fide but it was created after title was transferred to the
successor in interest in the foreclosure process;" (3) the tenancy is bona
fide but the successor in interest terminates the tenancy on the date of
sale to a purchaser who will occupy it as a primary residence;38 or (4) the
tenancy is bona fide but the tenant is without a lease or has a lease termi-
nable at will under state law.
PTFA further provides that even if a bona fide tenancy is termi-
nated in the foreclosure process, the successor in interest must provide
the tenant with a notice to vacate at least ninety days before its effective
date.40 However, the notice required by PTFA is very different than the
notice that due process requires.
PTFA requires a successor in interest to notify a tenant to vacate
within ninety days.4' The notice to vacate simply informs the tenant of a
certain date when the occupancy of the rental unit by the tenant ends.42 A
due process notice, on the other hand, informs the person whose property
interest is threatened of the pendency of the action and affords the per-
34. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982.).
35. See PUB. L. No. 111-22, § 702(a), 123 Stat. 1660-61 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5220 historical notes) (Supp. 2011)).
36. See supra note 26 for the definition of a bona fide tenancy.
37. See PUB. L. No. 111-22, § 702(a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. 1660-61 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5220 historical notes) (Supp. 2011)).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 702(a)(2)(B).
40. Id. § 702(a).
41. Id.
42. See id.; Notice to Vacate Letter, BUZZLE.COM, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/
notice-to-vacate-letter.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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son the opportunity to present objections.43 In the context of a tenant
living in a building undergoing foreclosure, due process requires that the
tenant be notified of the foreclosure action before they face eviction."
Since PTFA only requires a notice to vacate, it neither requires a tenant
to be notified of the pending foreclosure nor does it provide the tenant
with an opportunity to contest the effect of the foreclosure on the ten-
ancy. Thus, a notice required by due process affords a tenant stronger
protection from termination of tenancy pursuant to a foreclosure than
does the notice to vacate required under PTFA.
C. Foreclosures by Private Entities or Persons-State Action
The due process clauses protect a person's life, liberty, or property
against the threat of deprivation by governmental action." Whether a
governmental action-federal, local, or state-is involved in threatening
to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property is described as "state
action.""6
Many mortgage foreclosures are sought by non-governmental enti-
ties or persons, such as private lenders/mortgagees whose right to receive
payment on a debt is secured by a mortgage on the real estate owned by
the debtor/mortgagor that can be foreclosed if the mortgagor becomes
delinquent on the underlying debt. Since many mortgagees are non-gov-
ernmental entities or private persons, an issue arises as to whether their
efforts to foreclose a mortgage constitute state action under due process.
In the United States, there are two common types of mortgage fore-
closures: judicial foreclosures pursuant to a state statute and non-judicial
foreclosures pursuant to a power-of-sale clause in a mortgage document.47
Judicial foreclosures account for approximately half of the states' meth-
odology for foreclosure, while non-judicial foreclosure is favored in the
remaining states.48 Judicial foreclosures involve litigation that the mortga-
gee brings against the mortgagor seeking a judicial declaration of the
amount owed on the delinquent debt and a court authorized and super-
vised public sale of the mortgaged property, usually by a government offi-
cial, to satisfy the debt.49 Non-judicial foreclosures involve a public sale of
the mortgaged property pursuant to a "power-of-sale clause" in the mort-
gage document-a clause that allows the mortgagee to foreclose without
43. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
45. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 606 (3d ed. 2006).
46. See NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 32, 595-97.
47. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAw 365-67 (2d 2008).
48. Id. at 365.
49. See id. at 366.
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judicial authorization or supervision.so In a non-judicial foreclosure, the
sale itself may be conducted by the mortgagee or by a designated govern-
mental official.'
Whether a mortgage foreclosure involves state action depends upon
both the source of the authority to foreclose and the involvement of gov-
ernment officials in the foreclosure process. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Company, Inc.,52 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether a private
creditor who obtains, pursuant to state law, an ex parte prejudgment at-
tachment by the county sheriff of an allegedly delinquent debtor's prop-
erty is engaged in state action under the Fourteenth Amendment." To
decide the issue, the Supreme Court adopted a two-part test to determine
whether state action exists in a private creditor-debtor context: (1) the
alleged due process violation "must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible;"54 and (2) the
person charged with the violation must be a state official, or have "acted
together with or . .. obtained significant aid from state officials, or be-
cause his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State."" Applying this
two-part test to the facts of the case before it, the Court found that the
private creditor had engaged in state action because: (1) it had followed
an attachment scheme dictated by a state statute;56 and (2) the debtor's
property had been attached by a public official, the county sheriff, based
on the ex parte application of the creditor."
Based on the characteristics of the typical judicial foreclosure and
the state action test announced in Lugar, most judicial foreclosures will
likely be found to involve state action. Judicial foreclosures are author-
ized by state foreclosure statutes and involve judicial supervision of the
foreclosure process, as well as government officials to conduct public
sales of the foreclosed property." These characteristics of judicial foreclo-
sures will generally meet the two-pronged Lugar test for state action."
50. See id. at 367.
51. Id.
52. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
53. Id. at 924-25.
54. Id. at 937.
55. Id. at 937.
56. Id. at 941.
57. Id. at 942.
58. See SPRANKLING, supra note 47, at 366-67.
59. For example, in Scott v. O'Grady, the private mortgagee's filing of a foreclo-
sure suit pursuant to an Illinois statute and the county sheriff's involvement in the
eviction of the tenants was found to constitute state action under due process. 760 F.
Supp. 1288, 1294-96 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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However, finding state action in non-judicial foreclosures is less
likely because the authority for the foreclosures generally arises from a
power-of-sale clause in a private mortgage agreement rather than from
state law.' Also, governmental officials may not be involved in the non-
judicial foreclosure process.61 Finally, the state does not authorize the use
of its courts to supervise non-judicial foreclosures.62 Based on these char-
acteristics, it is unlikely that the Lugar test for state action would be met
in non-judicial foreclosures. Additionally, the clear trend in cases involv-
ing due process challenges to non-judicial foreclosures supports this con-
tention of no state action."
D. Application of Due Process to Tenants in Buildings Undergoing
Foreclosure
A residential tenant has the type of property interest that is pro-
tected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amend-
ments.6 ' After enactment of PTFA, most residential tenancies will not be
terminated by a foreclosure of the mortgage on the building in which the
tenants reside.66 Notwithstanding the added protections of PTFA, a resi-
dential tenancy could still be terminated by a foreclosure in certain cir-
cumstances. These circumstances depend on the nature of the tenancy,
the timing of various events including the occupancy, and the purchaser's
60. See SPRANKLING, supra note 47, at 367.
61. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra, note 21, at 688.
62. See SPRANKLING, supra note 47, at 367. Instead states that allow these type of
sales "usually provide statutory safeguards for the mortgagor." Id. at 367.
63. See John Pollock, Going Public: The State-Action Requirement of Due Process
in Foreclosure Litigation, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 458, 459-60 (Jan.-Feb. 2010).
64. See, e.g., Pappas v. E. Say. Bank, 911 A.2d 1230, 1237 (D.C. 2006) (holding
that a non-judicial foreclosure pursuant to a power-of-sale clause is a private debt-
collection activity that does not constitute governmental action); AgriBank FCB v.
Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc., 919 S.W.2d. 263, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that
Missouri foreclosures authorized by a power-of-sale clause in the contract "have with-
stood attacks on the basis of violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment . . . and the Fourteenth Amendment" because "parties have a right to enter into
contracts for nonjudicial foreclosures and that the power of sale exercised by a trustee
during foreclosure is not principally derived from statute nor otherwise granted by the
state"); Cheff v. Edwards, 203 Mich. App. 557, 560 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[Floreclosure by
advertisement is not a judicial action and does not involve state action for purposes of
the Due Process Clause, but rather is based on contract between the mortgagor and
the mortgagee."); see also NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 682-83 (stating that
with respect to power-of-sale foreclosures "[tlhe trend of the case law is clearly
against finding state action") (citations omitted).
65. See supra Part III.A.
66. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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plans for the dwelling unit. 67 Thus, if a mortgagee or a successor in inter-
est seeks to terminate a residential tenancy in a foreclosure, a determina-
tion of whether the termination is lawful under PTFA should be made
based on the unique factual circumstances of each situation.
A mortgage foreclosure on a building occupied by residential te-
nants can only implicate the tenants' due process rights if the foreclosure
involves state action. State action generally occurs if the authority for the
foreclosure is rooted in state law and a government official participates in
the mortgage foreclosure process.68
Unlike non-judicial foreclosures, state action has been found in due
process challenges to judicial foreclosures that terminate residential ten-
ancies.69 For example, in Scott v. O'Grady,"o a federal district judge found
that a judicial foreclosure in Illinois constituted state action under the
Lugar test because the mortgagee brought a foreclosure action pursuant
to a state statute" and the mortgagee obtained the assistance of the
county sheriff to evict the tenants in the building." Scott held that the
tenants stated a claim for relief under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because they had a protected property interest
and alleged in their complaint that they were evicted by the sheriff with-
out notice." Scott illustrates that, in judicial foreclosure cases, tenants liv-
ing in buildings that are undergoing foreclosure will generally have due
process rights if the foreclosure will terminate their tenancies.
Finding due process violations in non-judicial foreclosures when ten-
ancies are terminated without notice or an opportunity to be heard is
much more problematic. It is unlikely that courts will find that non-judi-
cial foreclosures involve state action because the foreclosure is usually
authorized by a power-of-sale clause in a private mortgage agreement
rather than by state law and may not involve government officials in its
67. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions to PTFA
that terminate a residential tenancy).
68. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
69. For example, in Hite v. Field, one of the earliest case on this issue, a Connecti-
cut trial judge found that month-to-month tenants' due process rights were violated
when the only means of notifying them of the foreclosure on the building in which
they resided was via a lis pendens notice recorded in city land records. 462 A.2d 393,
398 (1982).
70. 760 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
71. Id. at 1294.
72. Id. at 1296.
73. Id. at 1297. The court did not decide whether notice was adequate, but rather,
because the court was deciding whether to dismiss the claim for a failure to state a
claim, accepted the Scotts' allegation of inadequate notice as true. Id.
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execution. 74 An example of a non-judicial foreclosure that was held to not
involve state action, for due process purposes, is Pappas v. Eastern Sav-
ings Bank." The court in Pappas rejected a due process challenge to a
non-judicial foreclosure because the foreclosure of the mortgage, which
was pursuant to a power-of-sale clause, involved only "private debt col-
lection activities" and "did not constitute governmental action." 76 Pappas
illustrates that in many non-judicial foreclosure situations tenants living
in buildings undergoing foreclosure will generally not be protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the ab-
sence of state action in the foreclosure process.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS CREATED
BY STATUTUE
State legislatures can amend state foreclosure laws to provide te-
nants who live in buildings undergoing foreclosure with notice and an
opportunity to be heard in the foreclosure process. For example in Illi-
nois, the state general assembly reacted to the Scott v. O'Grady decision
by amending the Illinois foreclosure statute to require that tenants living
in buildings in foreclosure should receive notice and an opportunity to be
heard before their tenancies are terminated." The Illinois foreclosure
statute was amended in 1993 to provide that if a tenant was not initially
made a party to the foreclosure action, the successor in interest must file
and serve a supplemental petition against the tenant after which the ten-
ant would be entitled to a hearing in court to contest the termination of
tenancy.7 9
Although PTFA dramatically improves the substantive rights of res-
idential tenants living in buildings undergoing foreclosure and will likely
result in significantly fewer tenancies being terminated by foreclosure,"o
the procedural rights it creates are weak. With regard to notice, PTFA
creates no rights for tenants to receive notice of the foreclosure process
74. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
75. 911 A. 2d 1230 (D.C. 2006).
76. Id. at 1237.
77. See supra note 64.
78. See Illinois Public Act 88-265, effective January 1, 1994; Jan Crawford, Tenants
Won't Suffer for Sins of Owners, CHI. TRIB. Jan. 19, 1994, at NI.
79. 1993 ILL. LAws 265, Sec. 15-501(d), Sec. 15-1701(d)(e)) (amending 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 15/1-501 (LexisNexis 2011) and adding 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 15/1-701 (LexisNexis 2011)).
80. See supra Part II.
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involving the buildings in which they reside." Further, PTFA is silent
about a tenant's right to have an opportunity to be heard to contest a
termination of tenancy, which a mortgagee or successor in interest might
seek in the foreclosure process.82 Instead, PTFA only requires notice to
inform tenants when they must vacate their rental units."
PTFA should be amended to provide a residential tenant who is liv-
ing in a building in foreclosure with notice and an opportunity to be
heard if a mortgagee or successor in interest seeks to terminate the ten-
ancy. Since PTFA applies to tenancies in all states, including states that
allow non-judicial foreclosures, such an amendment to PTFA would en-
sure that all tenants who face termination of their tenancies due to fore-
closures would receive the fundamental protections of notice and an
opportunity to be heard.' Even though non-judicial foreclosures have
generally been found to not involve the state action that triggers due pro-
cess protections, basic fairness and sound policy demand that all tenants
whose tenancies may be terminated in the foreclosure process, including
those tenants who reside in states that allow non-judicial foreclosures,
should receive notice and an opportunity to contest the termination of
their tenancies. Guaranteeing all tenants a statutory right under PTFA to
notice and an opportunity to be heard to contest a termination of their
tenancies will reduce the number of tenants who are evicted from their
81. The only notice that PTFA requires to be given to tenants is a notice to va-
cate. See PUB. L. No. 111-22, § 702(a), 123 Stat. 1660 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5220
historical notes) (Supp. 2011)). If a tenant is living in a building that is in foreclosure,
PTFA does not require the tenant to be notified of the pending foreclosure. See id.
82. If a mortgagee or successor in interest seeks to terminate a tenancy pursuant
to a foreclosure, PTFA has no provision for allowing the tenant to contest the termi-
nation. See generally PUB. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660-61.
83. Id. § 702(a)(1). Section 702 of PTFA does state that a successor in interest
must provide a bona fide tenant with notice to vacate at least ninety days before its
effective date. Id. However, a notice to vacate simply notifies the tenant that they
must vacate the rental unit by a certain date. By contrast, due process concerns in the
foreclosure context focus on notice of termination of the tenancy and affords the ten-
ant an opportunity to contest the termination. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
84. The Illinois approach of amending its foreclosure statute to require that te-
nants be notified of their right to appear in court to contest the termination of their
tenancies is a sound approach in a state, like Illinois, that requires judicial foreclo-
sures even if a mortgage contains a power-of-sale clause. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 15/1-405 (LexisNexis 2011). However, even in states that allow non-judicial
foreclosures outside of the court system, tenants should also be entitled to notice and
an opportunity be heard to contest the terminations of their tenancies. This result
could be accomplished in states that allow non-judicial foreclosures by requiring that
tenants living in buildings in foreclosure can only be evicted through the judicial
process.
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rental units without notice and without any opportunity to challenge the
termination of their tenancies.
V. CONCLUSION
Many residential tenants have been displaced as a result of the re-
cent upsurge in mortgage foreclosures. Some tenants have even been
evicted from their homes without notice pursuant to foreclosures. In
states that provide for judicial foreclosures, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment should guarantee residential tenants notice
and an opportunity to be heard if their tenancies are threatened with ter-
mination in the foreclosure process. In non-judicial foreclosures, basic
due process protections may not be available to tenants due to a lack of
state action in the foreclosure process. However, tenants in all states can
be granted the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard by federal
statute. The PTFA should be amended to grant these basic procedural
rights to all tenants in the United States whose tenancies are threatened
to be terminated in the foreclosure process.
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